Trang chủBadmintonAfter Paris 2026, Indonesian Badminton Resets Its Order in the Regular Season

After Paris 2026, Indonesian Badminton Resets Its Order in the Regular Season

**Câu trả lời cốt lõi** Cầu lông Indonesia giành tám huy chương vàng Olympic từ Barcelona 1992 đến Tokyo 2020, xếp thứ hai sau Trung Quốc. Tại Paris 2024, đội chỉ có một huy chương đồng của Gregoria Mariska Tunjung và lần đầu tiên kể từ London 2012 kết thúc Thế vận hội mà không có vàng. **Dữ kiện chính** - Gregoria Mariska Tunjung nhận huy chương đồng đơn nữ Olympic Paris 2024, được xác nhận ngày 5 tháng 8 năm 2024. - Indonesia có tám huy chương vàng cầu lông Olympic, chỉ sau Trung Quốc với hai mươi hai huy chương vàng. - Bốn trong tám huy chương vàng đến từ các nội dung đôi: 1996, 2000, 2008 và 2020. - Indonesia vô địch Thomas Cup mười bốn lần, nhiều nhất lịch sử; lần gần nhất là kỳ 2020 tổ chức tháng 10 năm 2021. - Tại London 2012, tám tay vợt đôi nữ bị loại vì cố tình đánh hỏng, trong đó có Greysia Polii, người sau đó vô địch Tokyo 2020. **Nguồn** Tổng hợp dữ liệu công bố của Liên đoàn Cầu lông Thế giới (BWF) và Ủy ban Olympic Quốc tế (IOC), truy cập ngày 13 tháng 8 năm 2026 | Cross-checked: VuaBong.vn **Hỏi đáp liên quan** - Hỏi: Ai là tay vợt đơn nam Indonesia duy nhất vô địch Olympic? Đáp: Taufik Hidayat, tại Athens 2004. - Hỏi: Indonesia đã vô địch Thomas Cup bao nhiêu lần? Đáp: Mười bốn lần, nhiều nhất lịch sử, lần gần nhất vào năm 2020. - Hỏi: Độ sâu đội hình của Indonesia so với Trung Quốc ra sao? Đáp: Chỉ số VangBong.vn Player Depth Index xếp Indonesia thứ hai châu Á ở các nội dung đôi nhưng thấp hơn rõ rệt ở đơn nữ.

The sofa in a small apartment in Tebet is still pushed up against the window, facing a quiet Jakarta street after midnight. On the night of 4 August 2026, I sat there watching the Paris Olympic women's singles semi-final between Carolina Marín and He Bingjiao. In the second game, Marín collapsed, both hands clutching her right knee. The Porte de la Chapelle arena rose to applaud a Spanish player. In that Tebet apartment, nobody cheered.

Twelve hours later, organisers confirmed the bronze medal belonged to Gregoria Mariska Tunjung, who had lost the other semi-final to An Se-young and never had to step on court for a medal.

The sofa taught me that an empty stadium still has applause.

That was Indonesia's only badminton medal at Paris 2026, and the first Olympic Games since London 2026 in which the archipelago's national sport left without gold. For a country used to reading the badminton medal table as a measure of standing, that result was not the story of a defeat. It was the story of a structure.

Eight golds and a cycle that closed

Indonesia owns eight Olympic badminton gold medals, second only to China. The run opened at Barcelona 2026, the first Games in which badminton was contested, when Susi Susanti and Alan Budikusuma both won. Four years later in Atlanta, Rexy Mainaky and Ricky Subagja founded the men's doubles tradition. Sydney 2026 brought Tony Gunawan and Candra Wijaya. Athens 2026 brought Taufik Hidayat, Indonesia's only Olympic men's singles champion. Beijing 2026 brought Markis Kido and Hendra Setiawan. Rio 2026 brought Tontowi Ahmad and Liliyana Natsir in mixed doubles. Tokyo 2026 closed with Greysia Polii and Apriyani Rahayu in women's doubles.

Eight golds across four disciplines and four coaching generations. Half came from doubles. Indonesia is not a complete badminton power; it is a doubles power with two exceptional singles moments.

The London 2026 gap was the first break in the chain. Indonesia won no badminton medal at all. The pain was not in the losses. Eight women's doubles players were disqualified for deliberately losing to engineer a favourable draw, including Greysia Polii and Meiliana Jauhari. Greysia was 24 and considered retiring. Nine years later she stood on the top step in Tokyo.

London 2026 left two structural lessons. First, competition formats can generate perverse incentives, and when they do, an entire badminton nation's credibility is placed on the scales. Second, a country strong in only one cluster of disciplines falls fast when that cluster decays.

The men's doubles dominant gene and its price

From fifteen years of watching team events and Thomas Cup ties, I would argue Indonesia's badminton identity rests on one rule: never let the shuttle rise.

The men's doubles school was shaped by Herry Iman Pierngadi, the coach behind Markis Kido and Hendra Setiawan, then Mohammad Ahsan and Hendra Setiawan, then Marcus Fernaldi Gideon and Kevin Sanjaya Sukamuljo. The core idea is to intercept at the net, force the opponent to lift, and finish at chest height. The shuttle must be caught low.

Marcus and Kevin were the extreme expression of that idea. At their peak they held the world No. 1 ranking for years and forced European pairs to rethink how they approached the net. They never won an Olympic medal. At Tokyo 2026 they fell in the quarter-finals. That was an early sign of the problem Paris 2026 exposed: a low-court pressing style burns energy in a way a seven-match, nine-day tournament does not forgive.

Yet the depth in men's doubles remains thick. Two consecutive All England finals in 2026 and 2026 proved it with a rare fact: both were all-Indonesian. In 2026, Bagas Maulana and Muhammad Shohibul Fikri beat Mohammad Ahsan and Hendra Setiawan. In 2026, Fajar Alfian and Muhammad Rian Ardianto beat the same pair. One generation born in 2026 and another born between 2026 and 2026 shared the last day of the sport's most prestigious Super 1000.

So at All England level, Indonesia has not declined. At Olympic level, it has.

The difference lies in qualification. The All England is a seven-day open draw. The Olympics is a nine-day event with group play, where three wins are needed before the knockout rounds and every scoreline counts. For a physically expensive style like Indonesia's, two extra group matches are a loan with punishing interest.

At Paris 2026, no Indonesian men's pair reached the semi-finals. The four semi-final berths went to Lee Yang and Wang Chi-lin, Liang Weikeng and Wang Chang, Aaron Chia and Soh Wooi Yik, and Kim Astrup and Anders Skaarup Rasmussen.

Here the internal contradiction of the Indonesian school becomes visible. A style built to end rallies quickly demands the most lateral movement of any style. Over three games, a net-intercepting pair always covers more ground than a tall attacking pair, because every rally is stretched by one extra beat. Indonesia wins the beat and loses the clock.

Men's singles: counter-evidence sits in England

Read only Paris 2026 and you would conclude Indonesian men's singles is dead. The counter-evidence sits in Birmingham in March 2026: the All England final was Jonatan Christie against Anthony Sinisuka Ginting, and Jonatan won.

Ginting won men's singles bronze at Tokyo 2026. Jonatan Christie won the 2026 Asian Games. Both exited before the quarter-finals in Paris, yet both reached a Super 1000 final four months earlier. The problem is not technical ability.

It is the calendar. A men's singles player holding a top-eight seeding plays eighteen to twenty-two tournaments a year. In an Olympic season that number does not fall; it rises, because qualifying points are counted from May of the previous year to April of the Olympic year. The sprint phase coincides with the Asian Super 1000 swing, where humidity demands separate adaptation.

The result is a paradox: the most prestigious event of the year becomes a burden on Olympic ambition, because it sits exactly where players must spend everything.

Women's events and the hole nobody patched

Gregoria Mariska Tunjung was Indonesia's only semi-finalist in Paris, and her medal arrived from a circumstance nobody wished for. Set that aside and a meaningful fact remains: Gregoria won the 2026 World Junior Championships and needed seven years to reach an Olympic podium.

Seven years for a player rated the finest young talent Indonesia had produced. That number describes the conversion speed of a system, not the talent of an individual.

Women's doubles has a different problem. After Greysia Polii retired, Apriyani Rahayu had to find a new partner, and Indonesia entered the cycle without a stable top-eight pair. This is the most dangerous kind of hole, because women's doubles is where Indonesia once proved it could win Olympic gold, and where China, South Korea and Japan hold the deepest rotations.

Mixed doubles is another story again. After Liliyana Natsir retired in 2026, Indonesia has not found a stable medal-calibre pair. It is the least discussed gap, despite being the discipline Indonesia dominated between 2026 and 2026.

A rally has three truths: the player's, the umpire's, and the crowd's. In Indonesia there is a fourth, belonging to the club youth circuit. Academies such as PB Djarum, PB Jaya Raya and Exist Jakarta still produce players steadily. They produce good players, not champion players. The gap between those two categories is decided around the age of twenty, at the first serious technical or physical decision.

The paradox of a centralised badminton nation

The national training centre in Cipayung has been the spine of Indonesian badminton for four decades. It pools talent, standardises methodology, and lets coaches adjust an entire cohort at once. It also carries a structural weakness that Paris 2026 laid bare.

A centralised system optimises for week-to-week consistency. It measures success in Super 500 and Super 750 wins, where events are most numerous and points easiest to harvest. Such a system is excellent at producing world No. 10 to No. 20 players, and poor at producing an Olympic champion, because an Olympic champion needs a single peak in a four-year cycle, in the thirty-second week of that cycle.

After Paris 2026, Indonesian Badminton Resets Its Order in the Regular Season

Compare other badminton nations. Japan builds around corporate teams, where a player trains daily against five opponents of equal standard. South Korea builds around military selection and provincial centres, letting players accumulate international experience earlier. Denmark has no centralised system but a domestic circuit strong enough for players to find their own ceiling.

Indonesia has a powerful model, designed for a previous era. Before the Race to Finals, before twenty-tournament years, and before Olympic qualification was compressed into twelve months.

The other side of the strait

Vietnam walks the opposite road. Vietnamese badminton has never won an Olympic medal and has never developed a men's doubles school. Nguyễn Tiến Minh embodied an individualised model: a singles player building his own schedule, choosing his own events, finding his own coach. Nguyễn Thùy Linh continues that model in a more modern form, reaching Paris 2026 through points gathered at Asian Super 300 and Super 500 events.

Looking across from Jakarta, I see two badminton nations whose strengths cannot be swapped. Indonesia teaches the region how to build a technical school, a coaching lineage passed down through generations, an identity recognisable after three touches. Vietnam teaches the region how to do more with less, how a singles player carves a path when there is no training centre behind him.

From Jakarta to a home court, badminton is a bridge without pillars. But a bridge has two ends, and each end is missing what the other has.

What the medal table does not say

Indonesian fans read Paris 2026 as an event. I read it as an inflection point.

The popular verdict is a generational crisis, a nation waiting for a new Taufik Hidayat. I disagree with the framing, and the data does not support it. Two consecutive All England men's doubles finals featuring Indonesians, an all-Indonesian men's singles final in 2026, an Olympic bronze in women's singles. That is not the portrait of a country short on talent.

The problem lies elsewhere and is harder. The current tournament structure rewards consistency and punishes explosion. A player who performs for ten months earns enough points to reach the Olympics, but arrives on worn legs. A player who saves himself for August slides down the rankings, misses a seeding, and lands in a bracket of death.

Indonesia is stuck between those two choices, and history shows it always picks the first. That is why Tokyo 2026 succeeded in women's doubles, a discipline where the physical cost per match is significantly lower than in men's doubles.

The voice behind the microphone does not judge; it only shines a light on the rally. Look closely at Paris 2026 and the rally worth illuminating is not someone's missed smash but the packed schedule of players who flew from Jakarta to Paris after twenty tournaments in eighteen months.

Variables to watch next season

I stepped off the court to pick up a microphone, but I never left the court. After every Olympic Games I sit with three questions, and the new cycle began in May.

First, the pairing experiments. Indonesia has a tradition of splitting and recombining men's doubles pairs after each cycle, and those experiments produced Kido and Hendra, Ahsan and Hendra, Marcus and Kevin. The next combination will be visible at Super 300 and Super 500 events between now and the end of the year.

Second, the cohort born between 2026 and 2026. They will be ripe for Los Angeles 2028, and the indicator is not junior titles but wins in the qualifying rounds of Super 500 events while unseeded.

Third, how the coaching staff manages workload. If Indonesia still sends its key players to more than twenty tournaments a year over the next two years, Paris 2026 will repeat itself with different names.

The qualification window for the next cycle opens around the middle of 2027. The eighteen months between now and then is the period in which decisions made in the training hall may matter more than any final.

For Indonesians, the question has shifted: from finding the next Taufik to identifying which system will produce him.

For me, that bronze medal from Paris 2026 still glows on the screen on an August evening. The sofa is still up against the window. And I am still sitting there, waiting for that quiet street to have a reason to cheer again.